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APPENDIX A 
 
Harvard College and Massachusetts General Hospital v. Francis Amory 
26 Mass. 446, 9 Pick. 446 (1830) 
 
Decided March 1830 
 
Putnam J. delivered the opinion of the Court.  The confidence which the testator reposed 
in his executors, whom he also constituted his trustees, was unbounded.  He directed that 
they, as trustees, should not be required to give any other security than their own bond, 
without sureties, and that each of them should be accountable “simply for his own acts, 
doings and defaults as such trustee.” 
 The general question is, whether the trustees have abused the trust.   
The testator made provision for the support of his wife mainly from the proceeds 
of the trust fund.  He speaks of the profits, income, dividends, which were to come from 
it through their hands.  They were to lend the $50,000 upon ample and sufficient security, 
or invest the same in safe and productive stock, either in the public funds, bank shares or 
other stock, according to their best judgment and discretion. 
 It is very clear that the testator did not intend to limit the income to the simple 
interest of the fund; for it he had so intended, he would not have spoken of dividends and 
profits but would have given an annuity of three thousand dollars a year. 
 It has been argued that the testator gave the sum of fifty thousand dollars as the 
trust fund, and that the trustees could only have demanded that sum of the executors.  But 
we think that no important inference can be drawn from that fact.  It would not follow 
from thence, that there should have been a sale of the personal property or stocks of the 
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testator and a reinvestment.  The trustees and the, [sic] executors were  the same persons, 
and instead of going through the useless formality of a sale and investment, it was clearly 
competent for them to select from the ample funds of the estate, those stocks which 
should form the capital of the trust fund.  And in making that selection, it is very clear to 
us, that they should have preferred that stock which would probably give her the most 
profit, and at the same time preserve the value of the capital sum.  It would not, for 
example, have been the exercise of a sound discretion, to have appropriated the trust fund 
in the stock of an incorporated company which gave great dividends for the time being, 
but which would, according to the terms of its charter, expire as soon as the death of the 
wife could be calculated to happen.  In such a case nothing would be left of the capital for 
those in remainder.  On the other hand, if the investment of the trust fund were in stock 
which made large dividends, and which had acquired its value by the prudent 
management of its proprietors, and might be reasonably calculated upon as a safe and 
permanent capital, such an investment would seem to be according to the manifest intent 
of the testator. 
 It is somewhat remarkable that the testator did not himself appropriate the stock 
of which the trust fund should consist, but that he should have left the selection to his 
trustees.  But as it would have been necessary to empower them to change, sell out and 
reinvest, perhaps it was wise in the testator to leave the whole matter, the selection as 
well as the management, to them.  Be that as it may, he has given them that authority. 
 But it has happened that the value of the capital stock in which the trust fund was 
invested, has fallen, and those in remainder call upon the trustees to make up the 
deficiency. 
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 It was said by Lord Hardwicke in Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Atk. 514, that “to compel 
trustees to make up a deficiency not owing to their willful default, is the harshest demand 
that can be made in a court of equity.”  The statute of Geo. 1. for the indemnity of 
guardians and trustees, provides that if there be a diminution of the principal, without the 
default of the trustees, they shall not be liable.  If that were otherwise, who would 
undertake such hazardous responsibility? 
 It is argued for the appellants, that the trustees have not lent the money on good 
security.  The answer is found in the authority which the testator gave to them.  They 
were to lend, or to invest the fund in stocks.  They preferred the latter. 
 But it is argued, that they did not invest in the public funds, bank shares or other 
stock, within the true intent and meaning of the authority, but in trading companies and 
so exposed the capital to great loss.  And we are referred to Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 
444, to prove the position, that such an investment will not have the support of a court of 
chancery.  The chancellor seems to suppose that funds or other good securities, must be 
such as have the engagement of the government to pay off their capital.  Bank stock, as 
well as South-sea stock, which were in the management of directors, &c. were not 
considered by that court as good security.  But no such rule has ever been recognized 
here.  In point of fact, there has been as great fluctuation in the value of the stock which 
was secured by the promise and faith of the government, as of the stock of banks.  And 
besides, the testator himself considers that bank shares might be a safe object of 
investment, --“safe and productive stock.”  And yet bank shares may be subject to losses 
which may sweep away their whole value.  Lord Hardwicke considers that South-sea 
annuities and bank annuities stand upon different footing, because the directors have 
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nothing to do with the principal, and are only to pay the interest, until the government pay 
off the capital, and therefore that they only are properly good securities. 
 This reasoning has very little or no application here; for, in the first place, the 
stocks depending upon the promise of the government, or, as they are called, the public 
funds, are exceedingly limited in amount, compared with the amount of trust funds to be 
invested; and, in the second place, it may well be doubted, if more confidence should be 
reposed in the engagements of the public, than in the promises and conduct of private 
corporations which are managed by substantial and prudent directors.  There is one 
consideration much in favor of investing in the stock of private corporations. They are 
amenable to the law.  The holder may pursue his legal remedy and compel them or their 
officers to do justice.  But the government can only be supplicated. 
 It has been argued, that manufacturing and insurance stocks are not safe, because 
the principal is at hazard.  But this objection applies to bank shares, as well as to shares in 
incorporated manufacturing and insurance companies.  To a certain extent, each may be 
considered as concerned or interested in trade.  The bank deals in bills of exchange and 
notes, and the value of its capital depends upon the solvency of its debtors.  It may, for 
example, very properly discount upon the responsibility of merchants of good credit at 
the time, but who, before the maturity of their notes, become bankrupts from unavoidable 
and unforeseen mercantile hazards.  In this way a bank becomes indirectly interested in 
navigation, trade and merchandise, to an extent very little, if any, short of the trade in 
which manufacturing companies engage.  The capital in both cases may be lost by the 
conduct of those who direct their affairs, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable 
prudence and discretion. 
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 In regard to insurance companies or incorporations, the capital seems, at first 
view, to be exposed to greater risk, but it is believed that there has not been much, if any, 
more fluctuation of the capital in those investments, than in incorporated companies for 
banking or manufacturing purposes.  If the insurance be so general as to embrace a fair 
proportion of all the property at risk, it will generally yield a reasonable profit, and 
preserve the capital entire. 
 It will not do to reject those stocks as unsafe, which are in the management of 
directors whose well or ill directed measures may involve a total loss.  Do what you will, 
the capital is at hazard.  If the public funds are resorted to, what becomes of the capital 
when the credit of the government shall be so much impaired as it was at the close of the 
last war? 
 Investments on mortgage of real estate are not always safe.  Its value fluctuates 
more, perhaps, than the capital of insurance stock. 
 Again, the title to real estate, after the most careful investigation, may be 
involved, and ultimately fail, and so the capital, which was originally supposed to be as 
firm as the earth itself, will be dissolved. 
 All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself 
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion.  He is to observe how men of prudence, 
discretion and intelligence management their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but 
in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as 
well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested. 
 But in the case at bar, the testator referred the management of this trust especially 
to the judgment and discretion of the trustees whom he appointed; one of whom is the 
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brother, and the other was the cousin of his wife, for whose support this provision was 
made.  These trustees are not to be made chargeable but for gross neglect and wilful 
mismanagement. 
 The testator expressly authorized the trustees to invest in “other stock” than bank 
shares or the public funds; so they might as well select other stock as that which the 
testator named. 
 There can be no doubt but that shares in manufacturing and insuring 
incorporations are and were commonly called and known by the name of stock.  The 
investment would therefore be clearly within the letter of the authority. 
 It has been argued, “that the trustees should have invested in safe and productive 
stock, at their own and a sound discretion, without being governed by the known opinion 
of the testator” “that he was at liberty to speculate, but the trustees were not.”  If these 
positions should be granted, the desired inference would not follow.  If the testator, for 
example, had been in the habit of dealing largely in lotteries and games of hazard, it 
would undoubtedly not have justified the trustees in making such investments, 
notwithstanding the testator had been the favorite of fortune.  But if the testator had 
invested his funds to remain permanently in any stock, that circumstance might well be 
taken into consideration by the trustees when called to exercise their own bet skill and 
discretion.  They might reasonable and properly inquire and consider what their testator 
would do in the circumstances in which they were placed.  Would he recommend an 
investment that should give simple interest on a loan, or in stock that would probably 
give much more, and yet have the principal sum reasonably safe? 
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 The circumstance of the trustees’ reposing confidence where the testator had, is 
one which is always to be considered as tending properly to their discharge.  Thompson v. 
Brown, 4 Johns. Ch.R. 628.  The case of Rowth v. Howell, 3 Ves. jun. 565, has a strong 
bearing upon this part of the case.  There the testator, having great confidence in his 
banker, recommended it to his executors not to be in a hurry to withdraw the funds from 
him.  But after the death of the testator, the banker misapplied them, and probably stung 
by remorse on account of his fraud, he committed suicide.  It was urged against the 
executors, that they might have withdrawn the securities from the banker, and they had 
time enough to do so; but it was considered that the loss arose from the confidence 
originally reposed in the banker by the testator, and the executors were not subjected to 
the loss. 
 In the case at bar, the testator was a man of extraordinary forecast and discretion, 
in regard to the management of his property.  His vast accumulation could not be ascribed 
to accidental causes, but to calculation and reflection.  The fact that he had within three or 
four years invested nearly half his property in manufacturing stock, was entitled to great 
consideration and respect, and would, without any change of circumstances, have a 
strong tendency to justify the selection of the manufacturing stock as part of the trust 
fund. 
 We cannot think with the counsel for the appellants, that the dividend of fourteen 
per cent arising from the recovery of the claim against the Spanish government can be 
considered as part of the capital.  It was received in the nature of salvage which is always 
divided as profits, and not treated as part of the capital stock. 
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 And we do not think that the negotiations between the Boston Manufacturing 
company and the Merrimack Manufacturing company, in relation to making a large 
quantity of machinery, and the sale of patents and of patterns for castings, by the Boston 
Manufacturing to the Merrimack Manufacturing company, should be considered as part 
of the capital stock.  We have seen no evidence that they were ever treated as such by the 
proprietors.  We think the sums arising from those causes were properly considered as the 
fruits of their industry, and placed to the account of profit and loss of the Boston 
Manufacturing Company. 
 It is proved or admitted, that the stock which the trustees selected to constitute the 
trust fund of $50,000, was of that value when it was taken by them. 
 We are of opinion that they had a right to select the stock which they did for that 
purpose, and that they acted in the premises according to their best skill and discretion.  
And we have not seen any evidence which would satisfy us, that under all the 
circumstances of the case, they did not act with a sound discretion in making the selection 
and investment. 
 But if we were less clear than we are upon that point, we are of opinion that this 
whole matter has been settled in the court of probate, where the appellants had notice to 
attend, and where all objections were raised and considered.  The judge thereupon made a 
decree, from which there has not been any appeal. 
 We say the whole matter, because the executors and the trustees are the same 
persons.  On February 9th, 1824, the executors, after due notice to all persons interested, 
presented their account with the estate, and appropriated the stock which should 
constitute the fund of $50,000 selected by them as trustees for Mrs. M’Lean.  The 
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Massachusetts General Hospital was heard in fact, and (as has been said and not denied) 
the objections were made by the same able and learned counsel who now appears in their 
behalf.  And upon the hearing, the judge of probate allowed the account.  There was no 
appeal from that settlement.  By the legal operation of that settlement, the trustees 
became chargeable with that selected trust fund, and it is not now competent for the 
appellants to contend that those stocks were not legally appropriated by the executors and 
received by the trustees, as the fund of $50,000 given by the testator.  If the college had 
any objections, they should have made them.  Probably every objection to the account 
which could have been made by the college was in fact made by the hospital. 
 It has been argued that the account which was settled and acquiesced in, was 
rendered by the executors and not by the trustees, and ought not to bar this process, which 
is against the surviving trustee.  But it was a settlement of the very root and substance of 
this controversy.  The executors announced their selection and appropriation of the stock 
for the fund.  The trustees (being the same persons) became instantly chargeable with the 
management of it.  It is the original misappropriation and selection which is the subject of 
complaint.  Suppose the trustees had not been the executors, and that the college and the 
hospital had requested the executors to deliver to the other persons as trustees the 
particular stock to constitute the trust fund; could those institutions object again the 
trustees, that those stocks did not constitute a proper fund?  It would seem clear that the 
trustees might justify.  They would say to the two institutions, “you acquiesced in the 
appropriation by the executors, and we also thought it advisable, safe and expedient.”  
We think that that matter having been settled by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
without appeal, the decree is final and conclusive. 
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 The college and the hospital were especially put upon their guard; for the 
executors, in their letter of December 27th, 1823, informed their committee, that they 
should be duly notified when these accounts should be presented for allowance at the 
probate office, that they might object to any arrangements which the executors might 
have made for the capital of the $50,000.  As no appeal was made from the decree of the 
probate court, all parties in interest must be presumed to have acquiesced in the 
arrangements which were then made for the capital of the trust fund of $50,000.  If there 
had been an appeal, it would probably have been heard and determined before there was 
any depreciation upon the whole investment.  Indeed it appears from the evidence, that 
the stock of the Merrimack Manufacturing company advanced twenty per cent from the 
time when the stock was selected in February 1824, to December 1st, 1825. 
 The claim now made upon the trustees, to make up the subsequent depreciation, 
would seem to be justified only on the ground of gross abuse of their trust, even if it were 
not barred by the decreed in the probate court from which no appeal was made.  But upon 
examining all the documents and evidence, it seems to us that there is no reason whereon 
to ground that imputation. 
 Trustees are justly and uniformly considered favorably, and it is of great 
importance to bereaved families and orphans, that they should not be held to make good, 
losses in the depreciation of stocks or the failure of the capital itself, which they held in 
trust, provided they conduct themselves honestly and discreetly and carefully, according 
to the existing circumstances, in the discharge of their trusts.  If this were held otherwise, 
no prudent man would run the hazard of losses which might happen without any neglect 
or breach of good faith. 
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 The judgment of this Court is, that the decree of the probate court, from which the 
appellants appealed, be, and it is hereby affirmed; and that the record be remitted to that 
court for further proceedings according to law to be there had; and that the appellee 
recover his costs. 
  
